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ATROCITY CRIMES LITIGATION: 
 YEAR-IN-REVIEW (2009) 
CONFERENCE  
Abridged Transcript1 
February 4, 2010 
Northwestern University School of Law 
DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
PROFESSOR AT THE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
¶1 Welcome to the third annual Atrocity Crimes Litigation 
Year-in-Review Conference, which will cover the jurisprudence and 
practice of seven international and hybrid war crimes tribunals 
during the year 2009. I am Professor David Scheffer and I will 
moderate the discussions today…. 
¶2 This was an exceptionally eventful and significant year in the 
work of the war crimes tribunals, namely: the International Criminal 
Court, the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the War Crimes Chamber of 
the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon. If anyone doubts whether international justice has not only 
arrived but deeply entrenched itself in the international community’s 
response to armed conflicts and atrocities, stick around. Seventeen 
years after the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia, the unique mixture of laws that governs the tribunals—
what I call atrocity law—and the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes, prosecuted before the tribunals—what I 
call atrocity crimes—have become the new normal. We are here 
today to un-package the new normal and understand precisely what 
happened during the last year that advanced or impeded the 
                                                            
1 The full transcript and video recording can be accessed at 
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development of atrocity law, that extrapolated greater meaning out 
of the atrocity crimes, and that shone a bright light on the due 
process rights of defendants. . . . 
¶3 Göran, would you describe 2009 as a year in which 
international criminal law evolved significantly in the tribunals’ 
jurisprudence or did international criminal law actually experience 
muddled and less decipherable characteristics due to perhaps 
conflicting signals from the tribunals? What’s your general 
assessment of the performance of the tribunals in the year 2009?  
GÖRAN SLUITER 
PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM 
¶4 Before I answer that question, may I briefly react [to the 
prospect of genocide charges in the International Criminal Court 
case against President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir of Sudan]? I 
think it is a wonderful decision to include the charge of genocide, 
especially from a procedural perspective. In the Genocide 
Convention we have this clause, which has long been forgotten, that 
the state must either arrest and try the person accused of genocide, 
or extradite that person to an international tribunal of which the state 
has accepted jurisdiction. That is the ICC—I would say the tribunal 
meant in that provision is clearly the ICC. That is the international 
tribunal with jurisdiction. The issue now is whether states have 
accepted the jurisdiction. I think you can argue that if you say the 
Security Council has created the jurisdiction of the ICC over Darfur 
on behalf of all its members, then all U.N. members can be said to 
have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC. This could mean that Al-
Bashir can no longer travel safely to a number of states where he 
thought he could travel safely to because those are not states parties 
to the ICC. However, if that state is a party to the Genocide 
Convention, the prosecutor could then point to that state and say, 
“Wait a minute, you are a party to the Genocide Convention. You 
must either try that person yourself or extradite that person to the 
ICC.”  
¶5 Now coming back to the general assessment of 2009, it has 
been a very exciting year and also a very difficult year but these are 
of course very much clichés. I have one big concern which will not 
make me very popular among my neighbors—I am surrounded by 
 A T R O C I T Y  C R I M E S  L I T I G A T I O N  Y E A R - I N - R E V I E W  [Vol. 8 
 
312
prosecutors on both sides. In the jurisprudence my biggest concern 
is the rights of the accused at all levels—at the pre-trial level, at the 
¶6 trial level, and at the post-trial level. If you look at the case 
where in 2009 we have, for example, at the ICC an Appeals 
Chamber decision saying that you cannot be released prior to trial if 
no states want to accept you. As in the case of Mr. Bemba, the 
Appeals Chamber said, “Before we can release somebody, we must 
have a state that is willing and able to accept the accused person.” 
Well, what if no state wants to do that? Does it mean that the 
accused must always stay in detention prior to trial? So I think that’s 
a fundamentally wrong decision from a human rights perspective.  
¶7 A military case at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) [from December 2008 (but published in 2009)] said 
that the accused were tried within a reasonable period of time. [The 
detained persons were arrested in 1996 and received a judgment in 
2008-2009] so we have twelve years—for one accused it was twelve 
years and for another accused it was eleven or ten—of pre-trial 
detention, and ten-twelve years of waiting. How can there ever be a 
trial within a reasonable period of time? I am very puzzled, and I 
also don’t like the reference in that decision saying that the accused 
now have life imprisonment such that there was no prejudice to the 
accused. That is not correct because you are entitled to the 
presumption of innocence until the judgment in your case. And this 
is a general big problem: the length of these trials—and these are 
extreme cases at the ICTR but also at other tribunals. These lengths 
are sometimes absolutely unacceptable. We must find a way to 
shorten the trials, or, if that is not possible, [a means to] provisional 
release. 
¶8 In the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) appeals decision [in the] Krajišnik [case], where 
one of the issues was ineffective representation, there was a list of 
problems relating to the performance of counsel. He did not have 
enough time to prepare; there was no defense strategy and a lot of 
the Appeals Chamber judges said, “Well, it’s not perfect but it can 
do.” I wonder what really should be the standard for the Appeals 
Chamber to say: this is a situation of ineffective representation. It 
was a very puzzling case to me; I wonder whether if there had not 
been a completion strategy, then maybe they would have the 
situation where they could have said, “Well, we should have a 
retrial. . . . ” 
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¶9 One other significant decision is the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’s Appeals Chamber judgment in the October 2009 RUF case. 
That was the last decision pronounced in Freetown – there is now 
only one trial going on and that is [the] Charles Taylor [case] in The 
Hague – that was actually their legacy for Sierra Leone and for 
Freetown. And this is the “monster of joint criminal enterprise.” The 
majority basically said [paraphrasing], “Well, there’s joint criminal 
enterprise for all of the accused.” But there is one really strong and 
powerful dissent saying [paraphrasing], “This is going too far, this is 
one accused who does not share the intent of the other participants 
in the joint criminal enterprise, and therefore he should not have 
been convicted by the Appeals Chamber.” 
 . . .  
DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
¶10 I’d like to turn to Serge Brammertz, who is the Prosecutor at 
the ICTY. . . .  
¶11 A lot of people around the world, particularly in the United 
States and in the United States Congress, are now asking a lot of 
questions (and this is true in the Security Council of the United 
Nations as well) about, “Well when does all this end? We created 
you in 1993. Enough is enough!” 
¶12 Your office has prepared, as has [the ICTR], completion 
strategies to actually work itself out of a job. Serge, what is a 
realistic assessment of a practical completion strategy? 
SERGE BRAMMERTZ 
PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
¶13 The short answer would be that indeed when the Tribunal 
was created sixteen years ago, nobody was thinking about having a 
Tribunal for sixteen years. For that reason, in 2004, the Security 
Council decided on the principle of the completion strategy: that no 
new indictments could be issued after 2004, that the Tribunal had to 
concentrate on the main perpetrators, and that they had to transfer 
other cases to the region (the country of the former Yugoslavia). 
They also decided to help work on capacity building in the region. 
At that point, the timing for the completion strategy was 2008 for 
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first instance cases and 2010 for appeals cases. We are in 2010 and 
we are still running first instance cases. . . .  
¶14 So these deadlines cannot be respected for a number of 
reasons. We had Karadžić arrested after the decisions on the 
completion strategies, and other fugitives have been arrested during 
this period. So we are indeed today in this difficult situation where, 
on the one hand, we have the highest trial duties ever (ten trials on-
going), and on the other hand, we have to implement – to start – the 
completion strategy this year. So we will, in the next two years, lose 
sixty percent of our staff as a result of this completion strategy. This 
is, of course, quite challenging when we have a number of court 
activities and deadlines and stuff looming. We have a big problem 
with retaining staff. Every month twenty to thirty people leave the 
ICTY to go to the Special Tribunal for Liberia, the ICC, or other 
tribunals because there is no future for them if they stay at the ad 
hoc tribunals.  
¶15 Lucky for us, we have partners helping us in the region. 
When the Tribunal was created, there was no judiciary in the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia. We were replacing the local 
judiciary. That is one of the reasons why 161 people have been 
indicted by the Tribunal since its beginning. With the U.N. 
enlargement process and with the democratic revolutions in the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia, the region has strengthened its 
own judiciary; thus, the Tribunal has transferred ten cases to the 
region. We have today partner organizations in the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia, with war crimes prosecution offices in Serbia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo.  
¶16 So we are, on the one hand, finalizing our cases in The 
Hague, and on the other, transferring remaining material to the 
region. We are in this lucky situation where we have partners who 
can somehow take over, because for the next ten or twenty years 
there will be hundreds of war crimes cases conducted in countries of 
the former Yugoslavia.  
¶17 On the issue of the lack of an ICC completion strategy, I 
think the ICC needs a completion strategy for each situation. The 
ICC cannot stay forever in the DRC and cannot stay forever in 
Uganda. You need a completion strategy since the ICC is dealing 
with only a very limited percentage of cases. And the ICC also 
needs a partner in the region. I see this as one of the main challenges 
for the ICC: the need for a partner to deal with the impunity gap. 
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DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
¶18 Fatou, I’m thinking particularly of Uganda. Haven’t you, de 
facto, conceptualized a completion strategy for Uganda, for 
example? You haven’t apprehended anyone yet, but . . . 
FATOU BENSOUDA 
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
¶19 We haven’t apprehended anyone yet; but this is to comment 
on what Serge has said regarding the completion strategy for each 
situation, which I think is correct. I think when the ICC was 
conceived, it was meant to ensure that national systems would be in 
a position to eventually investigate and try their own cases. So 
obviously, while we are in these different situations, the aim is that 
the domestic jurisdiction will be developed to the extent that it will 
also be able to take on and try its own cases. The aim should not be 
to stay indefinitely. The aim should be at one point in time to exit 
that situation and make sure that the national jurisdiction is in a 
comfortable position to take on any cases, or as Serge has rightly 
said, to fill the impunity gap that has been created by [having the 
ICC take] only the most responsible and leaving the others.  
¶20 Regarding Uganda, we have not specifically started thinking 
about a completion strategy because the arrest warrants, as you 
know, have been issued against the leadership of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army but remain outstanding. We continue to urge those 
in the international community and those who would be in a position 
to help to ensure that Joseph Kony and the other leaders of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army who are still the subject of arrest warrants 
issued by the ICC are apprehended and transferred to the ICC. I’m 
sure you have noted that Uganda is trying to do some domestic 
proceedings against them. But I think those who should be subject to 
those domestic warrants are those who are not the targets of the ICC. 
I think that Joseph Kony and others should be transferred to the ICC 
and then [Uganda] should look for what to do with the others. . . . 
SERGE BRAMMERTZ 
¶21 We are also working on the worst case scenario: what would 
happen if the Tribunal closes its doors and the fugitives are still at 
large? Who would be competent to judge them? To deal with them 
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once they are arrested? That’s why the Security Council is 
discussing the creation of a so-called residual mechanism with two 
components. [This would apply to both the ICTY and the ICTR.] 
First, to deal with residual questions: witness protection, provisional 
release, and requests for assistance coming from the regions. All 
these requests will come in once the Tribunal is closed. But also 
with a kind of, I would say, sleeping Tribunal with a legal basis, a 
legal framework for the Tribunal to be activated once one of the two 
or [both of the two] fugitives are arrested. [This will] very clearly 
give this message that wherever and whenever the two fugitives are 
arrested, there will be an international judicial mechanism dealing 
with them; nobody can sit it out and wait for the closure of the 
Tribunal. And I don’t think there’s anybody more competent to do 
so in our case. 
. . .  
¶22 A word about the archives, which is the important question. 
[The archives] will be a problem for the ICTR and the ICTY 
because, as I said, even after the closure of the Tribunal, people will 
need access to the archives and databases. So more than a year ago, 
a working group was established to study the alternatives. 
[Discussion questions included]: Where to put the archives? Should 
there be one archive for the ICTR/ICTY, or two archives? Where to 
locate them? Who will have access? 
. . .  
¶23 What we are doing for example at the ICTY is to make sure 
that those who have to consult those millions of pages are able to do 
so. We have since last year, with the financial support of the 
European Union, set up a project with prosecutors from Serbia, 
Bosnia, and Croatia integrated in my office, which also shows a 
totally different dynamic than fifteen years ago when [the 
cooperation of the tribunals and the local jurisdictions] was very 
vertical. Today, it is very horizontal with such cooperation. We 
receive more requests for assistance from the regions than the 
requests we are sending there. So we have now liaison prosecutors 
integrated in our office, people who have very direct access to our 
databases. Every year we have ten junior prosecutors from the 
region who are [switching] every six months [among] the different 
sections in our office to make sure that, once we leave in three years 
time, there [will be] at least 100 people who are familiar with and 
are willing to consult all the databases in order to make sure that 
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victims, perpetrators, alleged perpetrators, and the judiciary have 
access to the writings… 
FRANÇOIS ROUX 
HEAD OF DEFENCE OFFICE, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 
FORMER DEFENCE COUNSEL, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE 
COURTS OF CAMBODIA 
 
¶24 The trial of Duch [before the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia] was the most difficult one because it happened 
more than thirty years after the fact. It was also a big challenge for 
the international criminal system. One big problem had to do with 
having a criminal court in a country where the offenses took place, 
but the government did not want the trial to take place. Because it 
was a hybrid court, the staff, the judges, the lawyers were 
duplicates: one from Cambodia and one from the International 
Committee. They hoped to establish a dynamic between 
international staff, but I am afraid it [did] not establish this dynamic.  
¶25 Many people in Cambodia see this court as a colonial court, 
like colonialism. The Prime Minister of Cambodia has said many 
times that he was praying for the court to fail and he was praying for 
the international judges to go back. This was the social and political 
context in which they ha[d] to work.  
¶26 One of the particularities is that the accused, from the 
beginning, said that he wanted to plead guilty, he wanted to confess 
what he did and asked the Cambodian people to forgive him, and he 
asked the Khmer Rouge to do the same thing. So the court ended up 
working more in the context of a truth commission rather than a 
court. This position of Duch, the accused, made the prosecutor feel 
very uncomfortable, because the accused was being a better 
prosecutor against himself than was the prosecutor. 
¶27 Everybody knows that in Cambodia there were 
approximately 196 prisons, but only one, S-21, [was on trial]. It was 
clear that more atrocities had happened in other prisons, other than 
S-21. And so the question arises: why not prosecute those who 
committed the crimes in those prisons? Why prosecute only Duch? 
This is one of the particularities of the Cambodian context. 
¶28 Under pressure of the international community, the 
Cambodian government accepted the tribunal to prosecute just a 
few, only the leaders of the Khmer Rouge. But it’s not enough to say 
that we are only going to prosecute the leaders, that if a criminal is 
 A T R O C I T Y  C R I M E S  L I T I G A T I O N  Y E A R - I N - R E V I E W  [Vol. 8 
 
318
not one of the leaders, he will not be prosecuted. It’s an extremely 
complex situation they have to deal with.  
¶29 So for two years, Duch pleaded guilty and he begged for 
forgiveness. But at the last moment, his Cambodian lawyer said that 
because he was not one of the leaders, the tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction over him. So his Cambodian lawyer asked for 
acquittal… 
¶30 Three main things to say about the [Special Tribunal for] 
Lebanon: [first], the Lebanon court is the first international tribunal 
to judge terrorists, and not the last; second, the court will have in 
absentia trials; [finally], for the first time, the international 
community created an Office for the Defence Counsel, which would 
be the equivalent of the Office of the Prosecutor. That’s huge 
progress for international justice. 
¶31 I always tell the judges in international courts, “Don’t forget 
why you have been nominated.” The reason I always say that is 
because when they establish an international court, it is to fight 
impunity. But when the court is created, it is there not to fight 
impunity, but to serve justice. And when the court is established, the 
prosecutor fights impunity, defense lawyers defend, and judges 
render justice… 
DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
¶32 I’d like to jump to David Schwendiman, who joins us from 
Utah, but formerly was well-established in Sarajevo. David, I think 
it would be fascinating—most of the people in our audience 
probably don’t have a clue about the War Crimes Chamber in the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and you must have had to have 
work with a slightly different perspective, because everyone else 
here is dealing with the top of the leadership pyramid in terms of 
prosecution and defense. You are at the mid-level and low-level. But 
also, your defendants are those whom the people probably identify 
with the most because these were the individuals closely associated, 
or at least allegedly so, with the commission of the actual crimes. 
Can you tell us how that played out for you in the War Crimes 
Chamber? 




FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE SPECIAL DEPARTMENT 
FOR WAR CRIMES IN THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE OF BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA  
¶33 I’m probably the only representative on this panel that comes 
from a purely domestic situation. What was going on, or what is 
now going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is not a hybrid court. It is 
a domestic court, and the domestic Prosecutor’s Office applies 
international criminal law through the domestic statutes that exist in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and have existed since 2003. How [to] 
apply domestic statutes that were put into place in 2003 to address 
conduct that occurred between 1992 and 1995 is another issue 
entirely. But the problems faced are fairly universal: how do you 
choose what to do now? Who do you choose to do it? And [how] do 
you work your way through this large caseload?  
¶34 The other thing [is that] our mandate is much, much broader. 
We’re more like a DA than a U.S. Attorney’s office. Our 
responsibility actually runs to everybody on all sides who was 
involved in a crime that was committed during a conflict between 
1992 and 1995. That poses very special problems for us. That also 
poses problems for us because we come after the ICTY has had their 
chance to do as much as they have done in this area. The ICTY, for 
example, has collected a great deal of the evidence that we have to 
have access to and have to be able to use. A lot of what was done in 
the beginning when the ICTY was first set up in 1993 was not done 
… with the idea in mind that ultimately what was collected was 
going to have to be used in a domestic court with domestic rules and 
domestic dynamics, like we have to deal with in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. So working out the relationships now is critical, and 
that’s what we’ve been doing for the last three years at least. We’re 
working very carefully with the ICTY to ensure that we get what we 
need, that we get it in a timely way, and that we get it in a form we 
can use in the domestic court. There are special evidentiary rules, for 
example, that we’ve had to come up with to allow us to use that 
product.  
¶35 Let me mention one other very important problem and that is 
that we have witnesses that we have to use in the domestic 
proceedings who have been used over and over again at the ICTY 
[to] generate transcripts, but [this has] also [worn] out [those 
witnesses]. What we have had to do is come up with a means for 
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organizing the work in Bosnia and Herzegovina to reduce the strain 
on that witness population. The killing was quite effective during the 
first part of the war, if you’re talking about cases from Eastern 
Bosnia and if you’re talking about Srebrenica [in 1995] at the end of 
the war. There are only twenty-eight living witnesses who are victim 
witnesses about what happened to the men in Srebenica in 1995. 
These were people who were able to escape or were wounded and 
left for dead, but then survived. We have to use those people over 
and over again unless we’re careful about the way we construct our 
cases. 
¶36 So the domestic side of this has selectivity problems. It has 
evidentiary problems that follow from having an international 
tribunal come first. … Uganda and France are both looking to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. I met with the people from Uganda last 
summer, over how they were going to address some of these very 
same issues (coming after a large international tribunal sweeps the 
field). France came to us to talk again about some of the problems 
that a domestic jurisdiction is going to have dealing with these 
caches of evidence and material, that sort of thing, as well as 
domestically adapting what they need to do in order to prosecute 
these cases.  
¶37 So that leads to the last point and that is, it’s in the domestic 
courts where a great deal more of the development of this law is 
going to take place. We are incredibly grateful to the ICTY and the 
ICTR for the development of the jurisprudence up to now. But when 
these institutions begin to drop off, it is in the domestic courts where 
the crimes against humanity jurisprudence is going to be expanded, 
where the genocide jurisprudence is going to be expanded – and 
there are a great many of them this last year with genocide, with 
genocidal intent, with the definition of crimes against humanity, 
particularly rape as torture and some of the other cases. And also the 
development of techniques or methods for dealing with these large, 
massive cases that are not typical to a civil jurisdiction, such as plea 
bargaining [and] the use of immunity in atrocities cases. We have 
followed the jurisprudence of the ICTY when it comes to a great 
many of these issues. So, while we always come last, figuratively 
and actually, technically, in what’s going on, it’s probably going to 
be at our level where these things have their greatest future. So there 
needs to be some very heavy attention paid not only to capacity 
building, whatever that means (and we can talk about that later), but 
also to the outcome of these decisions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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so far, we’ve tried over fifty cases in the three years that we’ve been 
doing this work. And there are about forty decisions that have been 
rendered in the first instance that are now translated and available to 
be studied; slightly less than that on a second instance (which makes 
[a decision] a final and binding verdict). So there is a growing body 
of this jurisprudence that needs to be very carefully scrutinized by 
people outside the system to see whether it actually meets 
international expectations or at least the quality the international 
community has come to expect. . . .  
SERGE BRAMMERTZ 
¶38 The one area where I would say the ICTY could have done 
better, and probably other tribunals, too, is in the area of outreach. 
Despite outreach projects and programs, despite work with local 
NGOs in order to explain judgments, the reality is that there are very 
many difficult legal concepts and judgments that are so complicated 
in terms of language used that everyone can more or less find what 
he is looking for. The experience we’ve had in the ICTY is that 
we’ve been criticized by almost all communities: [of] being anti-
Serb, because the majority of people across the region are of Serb 
nationality, [of] being biased against Serbs, and [of] not prosecuting 
enough people from other communities. So we are still working on 
this issue. What I have experienced in the two years that I have been 
in the job is the fact that if you do not have the local politicians with 
you, it is almost impossible. What we see still today—today it is 
better than five years ago—is that local politicians are [saying] to 
the international community what the international community 
wants to hear, saying we are committed to the principle of 
international justice, but saying domestically, you know we are still 
with you, they are prosecuting our heroes. That is very bad for 
justice. You can only be successful if you are so far away from the 
place where the crimes have been committed [and if you have an 
outreach program [and] have the local politicians with you. That’s 
why I’m so convinced that what the War Crimes Chambers and 
other local courts are doing is the most efficient. Having a Serbian 
court try Serbian nationals for crimes committed against the Muslim 
community has a much greater impact than a decision in The Hague 
where everyone will try to use the nationalist example.  
¶39 How can we measure it? Quite interestingly, in Serbia quite 
recently we [saw] an independent organization manage a survey to 
see what people think about General Mladić. As you know, Mladić 
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is one of the two main fugitives we are looking for. He’s allegedly 
co-responsible for the crimes committed in Srebrenica, where up to 
8,000 men were executed. So in those latest surveys conducted just a 
few months ago, nearly sixty-five percent of people interviewed in 
Serbia were against him being arrested and delivered to the ICTY. A 
majority also still believe that he is a hero and not a war criminal. So 
as international justice and the international community, and also as 
local politicians, I think we have a problem if today the majority of 
people consider Mladić to be a hero and not an alleged war criminal. 
It is still a very big issue for us, but I think it’s a problem for the 
majority of tribunals. 
DAVID SCHWENDIMAN 
¶40 To have effective outreach, and I say this from the receiving 
end of some of this, and also from the end that’s responsible for 
doing some of this on the domestic level, you have to have 
education, information, and explanation. I think the efforts to 
educate the public in the former Yugoslavia, and especially in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, got a slow start, but have gotten quite good 
in the recent past. The efforts to inform the public, the educated 
public, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are a little more problematic. 
How are you going to do it? Because the media in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is very polarized. There aren’t many objective 
journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So that becomes 
problematic. You have to inform yourself in our outlets, which are 
very limited. It becomes problematic if you look at the core values 
of prosecution, which are presumption of innocence, confidentiality, 
those sorts of things that you need to stick to when you’re dealing in 
any system, but particularly a domestic one. So there are these issues 
that are associated with outreach.  
¶41 One of the things that is most important about outreach, and 
was not done well in the beginning (and it’s a problem the 
international community faces because of the dynamics of this 
movement to make sure these cases get prosecuted), is that the 
expectation is often created that everybody who committed a crime, 
anyone who did anything, is going to be investigated, is going to be 
prosecuted, and in the end is going to be convicted and they’re going 
to get a maximum sentence. Now that’s extreme, but I can tell you 
that there are many people in Bosnia and Herzegovina who believe 
that’s [why] we exist. That’s what the ICTY existed for, and the 
great deal of disappointment that leads to a lack of confidence 
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comes from this expectation that just simply can’t be met. So, the 
one thing I would say about outreach is that it’s got to be done along 
these lines, but it has to peg expectations in a proper and realistic 
way in order for it to have any effect at all.  
COURTENAY GRIFFITHS 
DEFENCE COUNSEL, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 
¶42 I think the whole question of outreach has been a particular 
problem for the Charles Taylor trial and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone. I think there are question marks in the sub-region as to the 
need for a tribunal, particularly in light of the millions of dollars 
being spent on setting up this court, when contrasted with the level 
of depravation and poverty in Sierra Leone. And many Sierra 
Leoneans were saying, “Well, we don’t have roads. We don’t have 
running water. Why are you spending money on trying those merely 
most responsible? Wouldn’t that money be better spent building 
roads and schools and so on?” Consequently, there was a need to 
sell the idea of the court to the Sierra Leonean population and to the 
Liberian population as well.  
¶43 And by switching the Taylor trial from Freetown to The 
Hague, it created certain psychological problems. For people in 
Africa, the idea of Taylor, a black man, being taken in chains up to 
The Hague, created certain problems which needed to be addressed. 
I think the outreach department has made admirable efforts to bring 
the message, but they’ve been beset by many difficulties, one of 
them being this: yes, the trial is broadcast over the internet, so if you 
go to the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s website, you can click on 
a link and you can see the proceedings with a thirty minute delay. 
The problem is, who in Sierra Leone or Liberia has broadband? 
Outside of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s compound, you 
can’t get access for the most part to broadband in Sierra Leone. So 
who’s going to see it by that means?  
¶44 Additionally, however, the outreach department has shown 
some imagination. So, consequently, they take recordings of the 
proceedings to outlying villages, put up large screens and so on, and 
show extracts from the trial to the local population. And they also 
distribute snippets of the proceedings to the local radio and 
television stations for broadcast. And they’ve done a pretty good job 
with that in Sierra Leone.  
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¶45 The job they’ve done in Liberia, in contrast, has been not as 
effective. Thus, it’s been left to us as a defense team to provide CD-
ROMs of the proceedings to people in Liberia for broadcast in local 
media. And so consequently, what was supposed to have been one 
of the most important goals of setting up this court – to leave this 
legacy of respect for the rule of law and so on in West Africa – just 
hasn’t materialized because of logistical difficulties thrown up by 
switching the trial to The Hague. . . .  
FRANÇOIS ROUX  
¶46 For me, what is most important about the outreach is not 
only to show we fight against impunity. The most important thing is 
to show that we are building the right society. The world is not the 
white people on the one side and the black people on the other side. 
The world is not that. So we need, by the outreach, to demonstrate 
that we are going to set up a world with rights, with law.  
¶47 I would like to say something about Cambodia. One of the 
successes of Cambodia is the people who attended the trial; more 
than 20,000 people went to the trial! This is unique in the 
international community. . . .  
FATOU BENSOUDA  
¶48 I think the challenges that we face in this area, in the ICC, 
are enormous. Compared to the other ad hoc tribunals and the other 
hybrid courts, we are dealing with different situations in different 
countries, first and foremost. It’s not just one situation 
geographically limited to one area. That already is a big challenge. 
¶49 And secondly, we are also dealing with situations of ongoing 
conflicts. Whether it is the Democratic Republic of Congo or 
Uganda or Central African Republic or Darfur—in all the situations 
we are dealing with, conflict still rages in those areas.  
¶50 We have the issue of victim participation, which the ad hoc 
tribunals did not have. An obligation has been placed on us to make 
sure that the victims know that they have a right to participate in the 
proceedings. So this is an obligation that has been created not only 
for the Office of the Prosecutor, but for the judges and even the 
defense. And then we have the propaganda against the ICC. This has 
largely come about since we have issued the warrants against Omar 
Al-Bashir. There is propaganda against the ICC labeling the ICC as 
a neo-colonial institution that is targeting Africa. So we have to 
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work against this propaganda to explain what the ICC is all about: 
that the ICC is intervening because the jurisdiction has been 
accepted by those states (except in the case of the U.N. Security 
Council referral).  
¶51 There is also the lack of understanding of what the ICC is all 
about. We have to do a lot of work. We are still doing a lot of work 
going out in the field to explain that this is the ICC as opposed to the 
image that the ICC is only targeting Africa. For example, there is a 
lot of misinformation out there, deliberate misinformation. There are 
also a lot of deliberate attacks against the ICC from persons who 
have an interest, of course, to gain. So these are all the areas that are 
stacked up against the ICC as an institution. And we are doing, at 
our level, all the organs, the OTP and the Registrar – there is a 
program, of course, for us to go out there, to go to the communities 
that are affected, to explain. For example, we have this interactive 
justice radio program in which they come back to the principles of 
the organs and those dealing with the cases and allow the public, for 
example, to ask questions and we answer those questions. At various 
other programs, we are trying to be as targeted as possible for the 
ICC to be understood. But it still remains that we have to deal with 
so many situations at the same time. . . . 
COURTENAY GRIFFITHS 
¶52 Fatou, with all due respect, I think to dismiss the African 
concerns about the ICC as propaganda is to do a disservice to a 
much more fundamental argument which needs to be held about 
international criminal justice. Because I do think there is a 
credibility issue which the ICC has to address quite urgently. 
Because from my travels in Africa, there is a general concern that 
international criminal justice is being used, as François described in 
Cambodia, as a tool for neo-colonialism, and that in effect, it reflects 
global power relationships. If one looks at that map just to the right 
of the door, the one that came in the [conference] pack and which 
denotes areas where investigations are currently taking place, it 
doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that there’s an over-
emphasis on Africa.  
¶53 Now help me: what about Sri Lanka and what happened to 
the Tamils during the defeat of the Tamils last year? Help me: what 
about Israel and the Gaza last January? Help me also: what about the 
United Kingdom, and the role of my former Prime Minister Tony 
Blair? God help me, here in the U.S.A.: what about George W. Bush 
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and his role in the invasion of Iraq? We all know now that the Iraq 
War was illegal. But let me just take a straw poll: how many of you 
actually think that there is a real possibility that either George W. 
Bush or my former Prime Minister Tony Blair will be put on trial 
before an international tribunal? Show of hands, please. Who 
actually thinks that is a realistic possibility? Why not?  
¶54 Let me give you an example. My former Foreign Minister 
Robin Cook, God rest his soul, he died, was asked (at the time 
[when] the United Kingdom signed the Rome Treaty), on BBC 
News Night, a current affairs program, “So Mr. Cook, now that the 
United Kingdom has signed this statute, is there a possibility that 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, or President George Bush, might be put 
on trial?” And he turned indignantly to his interrogator and said, 
“This is not a statute to set up a court to try the likes of the President 
of the United States or the Prime Minister of England.” That speaks 
volumes! Why not?  
¶55 And currently in the United Kingdom, there is an inquiry 
going on as to the propriety of the Blair government engaging in the 
war in Iraq. I noticed a news program where they had an image of 
Tony Blair sitting in the defendant’s chair of the ICC. They had a 
professor of international law on the TV program asking, “Is it 
likely for Blair to be put on trial?” The general consensus was that it 
was not going to happen, and you and I know that it is not going to 
happen.  
¶56 Just recently, some rather intrepid lawyers in London went to 
a magistrate and obtained an arrest warrant for the Israeli Foreign 
Minister, who was due to visit London at the time of the Gaza 
invasion. The government intervened immediately, sent the Attorney 
General, Patricia Scotland, to Jerusalem to apologize, in effect, to 
the Israeli government, [for the fact] that British citizens had the 
effrontery to demand the arrest of the Israeli Foreign Minister. You 
and I know that power relationships dictate at many levels who is 
put on trial in these international tribunals. That is a major concern 
to me for this reason: I understood when I studied law at university 
that whether you be princess or prostitute, whether you be President 
of the United States or President of Liberia, the law should be above 
you. But I ask you, is that the reality of today? You and I know it is 
not. And that is the credibility gap you’re going to have to address at 
the ICC if you want to put an end to this debate.  
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FATOU BENSOUDA  
¶57 I see several issues, but mainly I see the mixture of several 
jurisdictions in international criminal justice being attributed to the 
ICC and giving the ICC a bad name.  
¶58 I think in what you have discussed, you have talked about 
universal jurisdiction. This is not the ICC. I see that you have talked 
about issues of the jurisdiction of the ICC; when and how the ICC 
can intervene. You have addressed the issue of complementarity 
when you know that the primary responsibility to investigate and 
prosecute under the Rome Statute rests with the state. It is not the 
ICC. The ICC is a court of last resort, and this is what the 
international community intended it to be.  
¶59 Let me now address the issue of the focus on Africa. First I 
want to say, personally, as an African, I want to commend the 
African leaders for engaging the ICC. The ICC has not, in any 
situation, except Kenya now, the prosecutor has not used his proprio 
motu powers to go into Africa. Instead, African leaders have called 
on the ICC and the prosecutor, and made public declarations saying 
we cannot investigate this case, we cannot prosecute it, please come 
and do it. Whether it’s Uganda, whether it’s the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, whether it’s the Central African Republic. And 
in Darfur, it was the Security Council that asked the ICC to go in 
and investigate. So what do I see here? I see African leaders taking 
leadership in international criminal justice as far as these cases are 
concerned. 
¶60 In the case of Kenya, what has the ICC done? The ICC has 
given Kenya the opportunity to investigate its own cases. I don’t 
need to go into all that has happened; I think you’ve been following 
it. But the ICC has given Kenya the opportunity to do it themselves. 
But we know, we all know, that Kenya is not going to do it. And 
when we met in Rome in 1998, we said, “Under the Rome Statute, 
impunity will not be an option. If you do not do it, the ICC will do 
it.”  
¶61 If I want to address Iraq, if I were to address the role of the 
British, of the U.S., again complementarity kicks in. This is the 
statute that we have signed, that we have ratified. Today, 110 states 
are a party to this statute. We did examine crimes that have been 
committed in Iraq, for those who are nationals of states parties, 
because that is how far we can go. Iraq is not a state party, so we 
cannot investigate non-nationals who are committing crimes. And 
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they’re in the U.S. Neither can we investigate Iraq, nor can we 
investigate the U.S.  
¶62 But, we can collect information, with the intention of 
investigating the likes of the U.K., which we have done (and it is on 
our website if you look at it), [and] which we have [also] done 
against Germany and other nationals who were part of this conflict. 
This is the role of the ICC. This is what we had to do. . . . 
ALAIN WERNER 
SENIOR COUNSEL FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROGRAM OF AEGIS 
TRUST 
FORMER MEMBER OF THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, SPECIAL 
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE  
CIVIL PARTY COUNSEL, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF 
CAMBODIA  
 
¶63 The dynamic, when you have the victims and their lawyers 
in the courtroom, is entirely changing. For example, in the ICC’s 
Lubanga trial, lawyers are able to tell Lubanga and his lawyers that 
it’s not true that children in the conflict were conscripted because 
your community needed them, because we ARE your community. 
We are the children who were conscripted. We are inside the 
courtroom and we are telling you that it was not for the interest of 
our community. And that’s really what I like with this victim 
participation of civil parties. It’s certainly not like one international 
community against one party who said, “Ho, ho, you are coming 
against my people.” But it’s changing the dynamic. 
¶64 Now there are so many questions about the Duch trial and 
Cambodia. It has been challenging for civil parties in the Duch trial 
because you had one judge in particular – Cynthia Cartwright, who 
was a former attorney general of New Zealand, a very senior jurist, 
and very well respected – who quite frankly did not understand at all 
why we were there. She’s 100 percent common law, so the need to 
have a lawyer in the middle … she did not understand why we were 
there. 
COURTENAY GRIFFITHS 
¶65 I still don’t. [Laughter.] 




¶66 So it has been a tremendous challenge for us to try to work 
as much as we could, to try to explain. There were about ninety civil 
parties, but the problem will persist in case number two, which will 
be the big case because there will be 2,000 or 3,000 victims.  
DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
¶67 Case number two will be coming up in about a year or so in 
Cambodia and that will be the top four surviving leaders of Khmer 
Rouge. So it will be a much, much higher rank than the defendant in 
the first trial.  
ALAIN WERNER 
¶68 …Genocide is going to be a very interesting issue. Genocide 
now may be charged in Cambodia for the Cham, which is an ethnic 
and religious minority, and for the Vietnamese. A very interesting 
question: I know from the inside that the Prosecutor’s Office is still 
trying to decide whether or not to bring genocide charges relating to 
Buddhist victims. And that is becoming very interesting to say that 
between 1975 and 1979 that basically the Buddhist religion—they 
were trying to basically eliminate, eradicate Buddhism. And 
probably there will be a decision. And there may well be that in the 
next month or two there will be a decision to go after the accused for 
trying to eliminate Buddhism.  
¶69 Thirty years ago, without much proof, how do you prove 
genocidal intent? Everything is going to be about inferring the 
intent. And the problem is that, like in Yugoslavia, in Cambodia, 
they went after everybody. They killed everybody. They killed the 
intellectual, they killed the royalist. They killed everybody. They 
didn’t kill just the Cham or the Vietnamese. They killed everybody. 
So how do you prove that there was intent to target one group? That 
is going to be, I would say in the next year or two, a fascinating 
legal issue.  
¶70 But let me just tell you one thing that is very interesting. In 
Cambodia, when you talk to the people, they don’t care about the 
legal issues. Me, of course, I am very interested, but they don’t care. 
They tell me, “Of course there was genocide in Cambodia!” And 
when you talk to the Cambodians, even at the end of the day if the 
ECCC says no genocide, that isn’t going to matter for [the 
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Cambodians]. Because I can tell you that the perception there is that 
there was a genocide. And I think that is interesting because there 
was a divide between what we as jurists ask about the Genocide 
Convention, and when you are in Phnom Phen and you talk to the 
people, they say it’s genocide, that’s it. 
 
DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
¶71 Before we get Courtenay’s perspective, I thought I’d just add 
that because of my position at the time, I was actually very 
cognizant of what was transpiring in 1996 in the Balkans. One of the 
realities of war crimes and the arrest of war criminals in the Balkans 
in 1996 is that it was the year right after the Dayton agreement. We 
had no agreement of any practical value with NATO as to how to 
actually affect an arrest on the ground in Bosnia. We didn’t start to 
reach those kinds of strategies for arrest until 1997. So in 1996, that 
was the year of no arrests, and we all knew it wasn’t going to 
happen, unless of course the NATO formula [was used], which is 
unless you walk in front of me and say, “Hi, I’m a war criminal. I’ve 
been indicted. Here I am. I’m in your space. Please do something 
with me,” then they could take you in. But they were not going to 
proactively go out there and actually arrest you in 1996. That 
strategy simply did not evolve until 1997.  
¶72 So, I have always wondered—I of course was not part of 
these Holbrooke discussions with Karadžić. Other aides were with 
him. But I’ve also often wondered if he—to be fair to Karadžić, if 
we wish to for a moment—whether there was some 
misunderstanding when someone might have said to him in the 
room something like, “Well, you understand what NATO’s policy is 
right now with respect to arrests. It’s only if you voluntarily 
approach them and literally give yourself up to them that you would 
be arrested. And our priority now is that you do not stand for any 
political office in any manner, shape, or form” in September 1996. 
That was the goal. Lustrate him. That was the goal for September 
1996. So, I’ve often wondered what may have been said that may 
perhaps have led to a misimpression at the time. And then of course 
may have been extrapolated again and again into something which 
he thought was a more formal representation, but of course was not. 
Courtenay? 




¶73 A similar situation arose with Charles Taylor. Just to remind 
ourselves of the history of the unveiling of the indictment against 
him: that was done in June of 2003 while Taylor was in Accra, 
engaging in negotiations with the warring factions who were 
besieging the government in Monrovia. Now the situation was that if 
he were to agree to stand down, that the indictment that had been 
declared against him would be stayed and no proceedings would be 
taken against him. Parties to that agreement included [Thabo] 
Mbeki, President of South Africa, [Joaquim] Chissano, President of 
Mozambique, [Olusegun] Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, and [John 
Agyekum] Kufuor, President of Ghana. That was Taylor’s 
understanding. The indictment, although declared, would not be 
effective if he agreed to stand down, which in due course, in August 
of 2003, he [did by going] into exile in Nigeria. Thereafter, and this 
is the reality of the situation, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who was 
subsequently elected President of Liberia, came to an agreement 
with Obasanjo that if she requested Taylor’s handover, he would do 
that. Initially, Obasanjo wasn’t willing to do that. But unfortunately 
for him, contrary to the Nigerian Constitution, he wanted a third 
term in office. And it just so happened that his desire for that third 
term coincided with a visit he made to guess where? Washington. 
And on his arrival, he was told in no uncertain terms: Hand over 
Taylor. And that was the background to the so-called attempted 
escape of Taylor by car over the border to Mali, where he was 
arrested and handed over to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.  
¶74 The important question is: should that be seen by an 
international tribunal as an abuse of process? We need to understand 
that the concept of an abuse of process in effect means an abuse of 
the process of the Court. But the Court wasn’t a party to the 
agreement. And that’s the fallacy in the argument – that somehow, 
abuse of process can attach in a situation like this. Because what 
we’re actually looking at is the interface between international 
diplomacy and international criminal law. Both don’t have the same 
goals. Neither do both have the same implications. And that’s the 
trouble with trying to use those types of agreements – attempts to 
bring peace to a situation – with the desire of an international 
tribunal thereafter to bring to justice the likes of Charles Taylor and 
Karadžić. That’s the difficulty. Because the Court was never a party 
to the agreement, why should the Court be bound by it? Because it’s 
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not the Court that implemented this agreement in the first place. 
That’s the fundamental difficulty with the argument. 
. . .  
DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
¶75 May I jump to the ICC for a moment, Fatou, and go back to 
Uganda? There are obviously risk strategies with respect to Joseph 
Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army indictees, many of which I’m 
sure you cannot talk about. But there was an event a year ago that 
was a very dynamic event on the ground, a military operation that 
went across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo for the 
purpose of trying to arrest Joseph Kony and I presume the three 
other indictees – I’m not sure if you were looking for the whole 
group or just for him. There were reports that the United States had 
been involved in some of your intelligence gathering, etc., to help 
facilitate your activity. But the Lord’s Resistance Army reacted 
quite viciously on the ground after the operation began. Can you talk 
to us a little bit about that and whether or not that was a sobering 
moment in terms of, “How do you arrest these individuals?”  
FATOU BENSOUDA  
¶76 What I think is clear is that what Joseph Kony has been 
doing over the years is to use time and money – money that he 
receives through assistance from peace talks – to be armed, to 
recruit more people, and then to attack again. He uses this time that 
is supposedly meant for peace talks to take place [to] rearm and then 
[attack] again. There was for the first time in a long time a very 
serious attempt to get Joseph Kony in late 2008. And of course there 
were the negotiations that took place – Vincent Otti was leading it, 
for the first time was being very open. But what has happened? Otti 
has been killed. Not only is Joseph Kony attacking innocent 
civilians, but [he is] also [attacking] those in his army. We’ve seen 
him attacking them and killing them because they were serious 
about the peace talks. So I think what Joseph Kony is doing … he 
should be seen for that. He’s using time and money to regroup, 
rearm, and attack again. There is no serious attempt, really, on his 
part that peace talks should take place.  
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DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
¶77 If you were to withdraw the indictment, as he has requested, 
would the peace process take off?  
FATOU BENSOUDA  
¶78 I don’t think so. I don’t think so. And over the years, I think 
we’ve seen the various methods he has been using to continue to 
commit the crimes he has been committing. And what we see now is 
not only that it is concentrated in Northern Uganda, but we have 
seen that it has moved on to the Central African Republic, it has 
moved on to Sudan, and to all these countries within the sub-region 
that he has [the] opportunity to operate in, even in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Look at the incident that happened in 2008. 
People are gathered to celebrate Christmas. He attacks them. Kills 
almost 1000 people. Takes the food these people were using to 
celebrate Christmas. They ate among the dead bodies, slept, and 
then they left.  
¶79 I mean, with respect to the argument that if the ICC were to 
withdraw the indictments, then the process, or the peace, would go 
on, I think that is a non-starter. We have to look at the ICC 
indictment as one of the key instruments in the first place in even 
getting the Lord’s Resistance Army serious about talking. We’ve 
seen that immediately after the indictments were issued, we saw the 
likes of Vincent Otti and Kony pretend to come to the negotiating 
table. But that is not what the indictment is for. The arrest warrants 
are not to bring people to the negotiating table. It is for the warrants 
to be executed, and for the persons who are responsible to be 
brought to justice.  
¶80 So I don’t think that ICC withdrawal would have helped in 
any way.  
DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
¶81 Christine, you had two blockbuster arrests in August 2009, 
one indicted fugitive from the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
one from Uganda. Was that a good night in Arusha? Or was it just 
finally sort of an exhausted sigh?  
¶82 But at large remains Mr. Kabuga. And there has been some 
tension between the Tribunal and Kenya with respect to Mr. 
Kabuga, who is a top indicted fugitive of the Rwanda Tribunal. Can 
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you give us your arrest scenario from the Rwanda Tribunal with 
regard to first, you got two of them in, but you still have a very 
significant one [at large] – and that whole relationship with Kenya?  
CHRISTINE GRAHAM 
SENIOR APPEALS COUNSEL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA 
¶83 Well, if we start with Nzuwonemeye, who was the indictee 
arrested in Kampala in Uganda, I think that was seen as a step 
forward, in that he was clearly visible on the evidence that had come 
out in the Tribunal in other cases, in particular in the case of 
Habyarimana. He is not the highest level official that we have tried, 
of course. He was at the captain level. He was well known, or as the 
evidence would suggest, he was well known as a Hutu extremist 
within the military, which is the prosecution’s theory, of course, that 
the Hutu military’s extremists were the driving force in relation to 
the genocide. 
¶84 So in terms of cleaning up the case docket, if I may use that 
word, or the evidence, it certainly was a good step that when he was 
finally arrested, we could now read evidence directly against him 
and put our case on. 
¶85 Also, it confirms the idea that there is no impunity. Many of 
the accused, of course, are sitting and waiting for the mandate to 
expire and in that way, evade justice. So any arrest, even if it’s not 
the high level person like Kabuga, is good in terms of making sure 
that you cannot avoid justice by hiding somewhere. 
¶86 That applies in relation [to] the indictment of Ndahimana, 
who was arrested in Congo. And he forms part of the Kabuga cases, 
which originally arose from the case against Seromba the priest, in 
the famous situation in which they brought down the church and in 
that way killed a large number of victims. Over a thousand victims 
were killed through the destruction of the church. Ndahimana 
featured in that original indictment against Seromba and 
Kanyarukiga. So these indictments had been split up as the indictees 
were arrested at different times. So there were three parties to that. 
Seromba was convicted and sentenced to life at the Appeals 
Chamber level. He was convicted at trial of twenty years I think, but 
then it was changed on appeal and he got life. And Kanyarukiga, 
who is currently on trial. Now we have Ndahimana, who is about to 
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go on trial. So I think also that is a nice closure in terms of having 
all three of [them] arrested and tried. . . . 
DAVID SCHWENDIMAN 
¶87 You asked about plea agreements. Yes. We began doing 
pleas, and some plea bargaining about a year and a half ago. We 
have followed, as best we could, the example that was set by the 
ICTY regarding some of the factors they used to decide when and 
how we should be doing that. We tried to improve on some of the 
ICTY practices. We hopefully did. We installed a policy which I call 
the Practice Direction. Practice Direction Number Two spells out all 
the factors a prosecutor needs to consider when someone presents to 
the prosecutor an offer to plead guilty. We really didn’t go out to 
people and offer pleas. It usually came from the defendant or, in 
many respects, it was something that was obvious under the 
circumstances generally because a plea had happened before, or 
because the man knew something that he knew we would want to 
know. And this has become more of a situation where we took over 
excavation and exhumation at the state level, beginning this last year 
in January 2009. More people began to come forward who were 
accused, indicted, and on trial offering up information about where 
bodies might be and where graves might be.  
¶88 As many of you may know, there were 20,000 people who 
were reported missing during the war. About 15,000 have been 
found and recovered. Not all of those 15,000 have been identified. 
There are at least 7,000, perhaps more, who remain unaccounted for, 
unfound. Many of those will not be found because they were dead 
on the surface. Those remains don’t exist any longer. But a good 
percentage are still in graves, either small graves of five or fewer, or 
mass graves of five or more around Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the 
one case we had a man come forward during trial who had actually 
been involved at an execution site at Korićanske Stijene and offered 
us the place where about thirty-five to forty bodies might be found 
in a place where we had not been looking. We dealt with the man 
and he was given a deal that was less than ten years, in the end, 
which happened without my approval. When we got back, after the 
court did not approve it, we made it very clear that no one was going 
to be pleading anything below the statutory bottom in the code. And 
that was then raised. But we went out to the location and I think we 
found about thirty-five bodies in that location. Again, they had not 
been found before.  
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¶89 One of the primary goals that we have, one of the objectives 
in our mission statement, is to use the forensic process to the extent 
it’s reasonable to help find and locate those who are still missing 
and identify and reunite them with their families. This has a forensic 
purpose, obviously, because we need to prosecute this case with the 
forensic evidence, but this is also a humanitarian issue for us. That 
plea was criticized only for the amount of time that the person got, 
not for the fact of the plea.  
¶90 I also pled Pasko Ljubičić, the person responsible for Amici. 
And we pled one of the defendants, Dusan Fustar, to a nine-year 
term. But we did it partly to get this plea agreement process started, 
but also because under the circumstances it made sense.  
¶91 One of the factors obviously that we’re looking at is whether 
or not we have the evidence to continue with the prosecution that 
would result in a conviction as we worked our way through the trial. 
Often times there will be a failure to be able to obtain a witness, or 
whatever. Particularly in the domestic courts, because while the 
ICTY and the ICTR and others have the ability to go anywhere they 
want and acquire a witness, I’m in a domestic court [and so] I’m 
bound by every rule that has to do with my going to Spain, for 
example, to talk to anyone the ICTY convicted and incarcerated in 
Spain. I have to get the permission of the Spanish government even 
to come into that country for that purpose. I can’t simply go there. If 
it’s an ICTY witness or defendant, or someone [who is] in custody 
there, I have to get the permission of the ICTY to go do those 
interviews. So it becomes complicated for me. And often, as it was 
in the case of Ljubičić, we had to negotiate a plea because we failed 
in getting together some of the evidence that we needed to have. . . . 
COURTENAY GRIFFITHS 
¶92 I was quite shocked when I arrived in the international 
tribunals at the disparity of resources between the prosecution and 
the defense. I accept that given the much greater role that the 
prosecution has to play within a criminal trial that you’re not talking 
about exact equality of resources. That’s not realistic. But the fact is, 
for a case the size of Charles Taylor, the initial legal team consisted 
of two lawyers and a couple of legal assistants, which was totally 
inadequate. And it left me with the abiding impression that many of 
these tribunals are established to convict. And consequently, there 
doesn’t appear to be . . . I’m glad I’ve provoked some interest 
[laughter] this late in the afternoon. I see everyone coming to life.  
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FATOU BENSOUDA  
¶93 Coming at you. 
DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
¶94 No jet lag anymore. 
COURTENAY GRIFFITHS 
¶95 Jet lag is gone. And it seemed to me that the basic principle 
[is] that in order for international criminal law to have any 
credibility, the defense has to be in a position to put up a proper 
fight against the prosecution. Otherwise, it will lose all credibility. 
The defense has to be in a position to protect the rights of the 
defendant properly. Otherwise, let’s just forget it. Let’s just call this 
victor’s justice and be done with it. All right? That was my initial 
impression. But at the same time, I have to say that as a result of the 
stance taken by Charles Taylor and his initial team, I have a feeling 
that the team I am now head of is perhaps one of the best defense 
resource teams there’s ever been in an international tribunal. I’m 
pretty confident that we are the best resourced... 
¶96 In any event, in January [of last year], the prosecution in the 
Charles Taylor case called a witness in, one Hassan Bility, a 
Liberian journalist who was, allegedly of course, detained and 
tortured on Taylor’s orders. Now during the course of his cross-
examination by me, he informed us for the first time that with the 
assistance of ECOMOG, that is the Economic Community of West 
African States that had sent troops to try to stabilize the situation in 
Sierra Leone, he had been transported clandestinely from Liberia 
into Sierra Leone in order to report on events in that neighboring 
country. Now that was of interest to the defense for this reason: we 
had evidence that ECOMOGC was involved in arming one of the 
factions in the Sierra Leonean conflict. So from our point of view, 
what were they doing injecting this Liberian journalist into that 
situation? So I wanted to ask Mr. Bility some questions about this. 
He objected on the basis that so to do would involve him disclosing 
his sources. Now our argument was, this has nothing to do with 
disclosing your sources. First of all, what we want to know is the 
identity of those who facilitated your entry into Sierra Leone. It’s 
not as if you obtained information from these individuals. They 
merely facilitated your clandestine entry into the country. So that 
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shouldn’t be covered. Secondly, we argued that in a situation such as 
this, journalistic privilege should be trumped by the need to provide 
evidence that directly goes to the guilt or the innocence of the 
accused. And in our view, that overriding consideration should 
trump any journalistic privilege.  
¶97 And we also argued, now look, you claim you were assisted 
in entering Sierra Leone by ECOMOG military officers. They are 
military officers! What kinds of concerns can there be about the 
safety of these individuals, especially now that they were safely 
back in Nigeria? What concerns could there be to trump the 
defendant’s need to know in that situation? Nonetheless, the 
Tribunal decided against us, on the basis that what we in Europe 
regard as Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights – 
what you in the U.S. regard as the First Amendment under the 
Constitution – their view was that that is such an important principle 
that it cannot be endangered in any way. And that by forcing Bility 
to disclose who it was that facilitated his entry, the right under 
Article 10 – your First Amendment – should override all of that 
because of the democratic concern for freedom of speech.  
¶98 I’m not so sure on the facts of that case that I agree with that 
reasoning. It might have been a different matter if, for example, the 
journalist had received direct information from a different source. 
But what it does expose is this: journalists are not evidence gatherers 
in the sense in which I as a defense advocate understand it in the 
criminal court context. For the most part, those I am going to 
examine about the evidence-gathering process are, for example, 
police officers or investigators, who operate under a certain set of 
rules and regulations as to how they must behave and the propriety 
of the methods they can employ in gathering evidence. Journalists 
don’t operate under the same kind of guidance. And so in my mind 
as a defense advocate, it’s very dangerous to place journalists in that 
situation because they’re always going to have to tread that very 
narrow line between the disclosure of sources and, frankly, telling 
the truth. And I’m not so sure you want to place yourself in that kind 
of invidious situation. 
ROY GUTMAN 
FOREIGN EDITOR, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS 
¶99 Can I just say that I am familiar with the cases that have 
come before The Hague Tribunal, having been asked at least four or 
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five times myself to testify based on my reporting on the Balkan 
Wars. And the practice of U.S. news organizations on the whole is 
rather different than the practice of European news organizations, in 
that it is almost universal that U.S. news organizations do not want 
their reporters to testify for the very reason that that you can’t 
actually go back to the scene as a neutral, detached person easily. 
And in the case you’re just mentioning, the reporter could not work 
with ECOMOG in the future very easily, or with the people who 
helped him in this particular case, and go back to them for more 
information, if he were to testify about who they were and what they 
did on behalf of your client in this particular case.  
¶100 Now I’ve laid out the reasons that Americans are reluctant to 
testify. But it’s interesting. One of our British colleagues, Ed 
Bulleomi, is one of a number of European journalists who are not 
only willing to testify, but were eager to testify before The Hague 
Tribunal. But I think there’s a cautionary tale when reporters 
volunteer like that. And Ed is the proof of it. He offered to speak on 
behalf of the Karadžić case or one of the major cases and the 
defense said, it’s all well and good that Ed is going to speak on 
behalf of … I think it was the prosecution based on his articles. But 
then there is the issue of discovery. “We’d like to see his notes. 
We’d like to see his notebooks.” And once he was already in the 
court, he didn’t really have a lot of choice. So, they took his 
notebooks and went through them and scoured them. I don’t know, 
my notes aren’t always all that neat, but in fact I could always find 
things because I put in telephone numbers, sources, ideas, as well as 
quotes from sources. And quite frankly, my notebooks are a pretty 
open book. But I don’t think in a court situation, I want everything 
of my own methodology put before the court. And I think that’s one 
of the major reasons I probably shouldn’t testify, or at least put it 
this way: there are issues of conscience from every one of us as 
journalists. We all hope that justice will be done. The stories we are 
writing is because of injustice and massive injustice and atrocity. 
And that’s why they’re news, because they shouldn’t be happening 
and that’s what journalism is all about—presenting that to the 
public, what shouldn’t be happening and what should be stopped. 
But there are examples . . . there are cases where at least in my 
mind, if my testimony were going to make the difference between 
the acquittal of a criminal and the jailing of an innocent man, I think 
I would sooner testify than carry on with my job, because I also 
have a conscience.  
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¶101 But on the whole, I think the tribunal has been a little 
overzealous in inviting journalists. And the case of Jonathan Randall 
of the Washington Post was really a good one in that I think they 
went much too far in issuing a subpoena to him. And I think the 
rules are reasonable. But on the whole, I think I would err on the 
side of caution and not put journalists before this terrible dilemma.... 
¶102 The Bush Administration, for all of its flaws, or elements 
that you could criticize, has been supportive of some of these 
international tribunals. For all of the unwillingness to sign onto the 
International Criminal Court—and of course the Democrats were 
not much better—they worked out a modus of cooperating with the 
Tribunal and being supportive of it. But I think Afghanistan is a big 
exception. I don’t know completely why, but I can suspect it. And I 
can only give you anecdotal evidence, which is the journalistic 
defect. For example, I was involved in the story in 2002 about when 
General Dostum organized these container shipments of human 
beings, who had been captured and were prisoners of war, and 
should have been treated as prisoners of war, who were basically 
suffocated, if not executed with firing squads.  
¶103 But anyway, and what we did—I was [at] Newsweek—
before we published a word, we went to the Americans and laid 
things out at every level we could and asked for their response. 
Because the U.S. Special Operations Forces were embedded in 
General Dostum’s units. They were there—they came in after 
9/11—because they knew what was going on, and it was essential 
that they knew what was going on. And General Dostum was very 
cooperative and he was their man in some ways. And they would not 
comment on it. In fact, they would not say anything about it. And 
General Dostum basically got away with it at that point. Now fast-
forward to 2008. We sent in a reporter—I worked for McClatchy at 
that point—and we sent in a reporter who I think took some life 
risks in going into Dash-ti-lali, quite frankly, where we had heard, 
from an NGO called Physicians for Human Rights, where we had 
heard that the graves had been moved. But we didn’t know the 
details. We didn’t know when, we didn’t know who exactly had 
done it. You could assume it was General Dostum. But anyway, this 
fellow Tom Lassiter actually went out to the graves. He discovered 
new ones. He brought out a GPS unit with him. You know, he had 
an exact fix on these graves. And he reportedly, very carefully, that 
in fact he thought that additional graves had been disturbed. And 
once again, since it’s journalistic practice, at least with the old-
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fashioned, mainstream organizations, we went to the authorities. We 
went to the U.S. military, to the U.S. Embassy, [and] to Mr. Karzai’s 
government. General Dostum had actually been asked to leave the 
country at that point for other, slightly unrelated, reasons, so he was 
in Turkey. So we actually staked him out in Turkey. Lassiter went 
there and spent a good ten days trying to get Dostum to talk to him. 
In any case, no comment. Once again, no comment.  
¶104 So what does the pattern tell you? It says that . . . you know, 
they made the argument in 2002 that this is not the time to put 
people on trial for war crimes, especially when they were war crimes 
by allies of the United States, namely, General Dostum, because we 
need him in the future. And what is the argument in 2008? In 2009? 
And why exactly has General Dostum been promoted into another 
government position? And where is the United States with some 
kind of public statement beyond the one that I just quoted you from 
this General? It’s a mystery to me. And I wish that there was some 
way that something could get him, because I’m convinced that if 
you want peace in Afghanistan, you have to, if not unearth these 
remains, you’ve got to account for them. You’ve got to find out who 
did it. You’ve got to give some closure to the families of the 
Taliban, who are real people, and to the families of the Hazaras, who 
were killed in 1998, and the families of the Uzbeks, who were killed 
at some other point. But whatever it is, you’ve got to give closure. 
And I think it’s a real short-sightedness by the American side that 
international justice is not just a slogan. I mean, this conference 
reveals just how far it’s come. But this is the single biggest example 
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¶105 Now the third amendment [to be considered at the Review 
Conference of the International Criminal Court in Kampala, 
Uganda] is by far the biggest, the one you have heard about, the one 
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you will hear about, and that is the crime of aggression. You know 
the Court has jurisdiction over three crimes, which we call the core 
crimes in Rome: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes. It also has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, because 
aggression is already in the Statute. But at this time, the Court is not 
able to exercise that jurisdiction. Because what we did in Rome is 
we were not able to agree on a definition of crime of aggression and 
we were also not able—and that is a linked issue—we were also not 
able to agree on the extent of jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. So what we did is say, “If and when we review the 
Rome Statute, we will take up this question again.”  
¶106 David [Scheffer] has mentioned that I have been foolish 
enough to chair the working group that dealt with the crime of 
aggression for, well, I guess for five years, and we are now 
approaching the big moment in a way where we have the 
opportunity to deal with the crime of aggression at the review 
conference. So someone has asked me at some point whether it will 
happen and whether it will be adopted. I don’t have a final answer 
for that. My answer to that is this is the moment for states to decide 
what they want as far as aggression is concerned. I think most 
people believe that as far as the legal groundwork that was necessary 
we have come a long way. I do believe we have done very good 
work on the definition. We have found language there that I believe 
is acceptable to a very large number of states, and a definition that 
finds very strong support across the board. We always knew that 
was going to be the easier part, or the less difficult part. It has not 
been easy by any measure, but it was the less difficult part.  
¶107 The more difficult part is to say, “What is the role of the 
Security Council in triggering the exercise of jurisdiction?” And that 
as you know, to some extent, is a legal question, but it’s far more a 
political question. We do not have an agreement on this. We do not 
have a compromise on this. We are still trying to find ways to bring 
the groups closer together. You know, of course, that the permanent 
members of the Security Council in particular are holding the strong 
view that the Security Council should have the exclusive 
competence, in accordance with Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, to 
say this-and-this act was an act of aggression. And if, and only if, 
the Security Council has made such a determination that a State has 
made an act of aggression against another State can the ICC come in 
and say, “Okay, we have a determination from the Security Council, 
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now let’s see who has individual criminal responsibility.” So that is 
the view of the permanent members of the Security Council. 
¶108 As you can imagine, and as you probably know, that is not a 
position that many other states agree with. And those who do not 
agree with that view don’t do so for two reasons, essentially. The 
first is the record of the Security Council in determining that an act 
of aggression has been committed. The Security Council pretty 
much never does that. In sixty years. So that is the record. I could of 
course argue that it could lead to criminal responsibility, then maybe 
the Security Council will change its ways. But those of us who know 
the Security Council—and I happen to be one of them, because I am 
an Ambassador in New York—have serious doubts about that. So 
that is the first reason.  
¶109 The second reason, of course, is that these people argue that 
this is an independent judicial institution. Any decision made by the 
Security Council is inherently a political decision. It’s never really a 
legal decision. So having the Court dependent on the Security 
Council on a question of such magnitude will undermine the 
perception that the ICC is an independent judicial institution. And I 
think that is a serious argument. We have, of course, under the 
current system, under the Rome Statute, as it is today, we already 
have a role of the Security Council. The Security Council has the 
competence to refer a situation to the ICC, which it has done once in 
the case of Darfur, which as you know is a very controversial 
decision. And is something which Fatou [Bensouda] and myself and 
many others have to explain over and over again; this is not 
something that the ICC decided, this is something that the Security 
Council decided. So that’s the first role the Council already has 
under the Statute. The second role under the famous Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute is the competence of the Security Council to 
suspend an ongoing investigation. So the Security Council can, and 
it has been discussed, both in the case of Darfur and earlier on also 
in the case of Uganda, the Security Council can decide that, in the 
interest of peace (and that can mean a lot of things), in the interest of 
peace . . . the investigation must be suspended so the Council can 
directly intervene in the work of the ICC. 
¶110 So this is where we are on aggression. The difficulty is clear. 
It’s really about defining under what conditions this court can 
exercise jurisdiction. There is actually an agreement, which is 
something I want to emphasize very strongly, there is actually an 
agreement among states that the first [entity] to make a 
 A T R O C I T Y  C R I M E S  L I T I G A T I O N  Y E A R - I N - R E V I E W  [Vol. 8 
 
344
determination should be the Security Council. And that is a big 
compromise in a way, on the part of those who are very skeptical 
about any role of the Security Council in general, as far as the ICC is 
concerned. So the question we are dealing with now is simply, 
“What happens if the Security Council does not make a 
determination? Can somebody else do it? Can the General Assembly 
do it? Can in the International Court of Justice do it? Can the Court 
itself do it? Can the Pre-Trial Chamber do it?” So that is the 
question. 
¶111 This, as you can imagine, will take up most of our time, as 
far as the amendment part is concerned in Kampala. The other two 
issues will be relatively simple.  
¶112 Now let me go to the second dimension, the stock taking 
dimension. . . . [I]n The Hague in November we identified four 
topics that we will discuss in the framework of this stock taking 
exercise. One is complementarity. Second is cooperation. Third is 
victims and affected communities and the fourth is peace and 
justice. And I think as you have also gathered today from the 
discussions this morning, these are really four of the central issues 
when it comes to the ICC and when it comes to international justice 
in general.  
¶113 Complementarity is, perhaps, the key feature anyway of the 
International Criminal Court. The Court is, in a way, a default 
institution. The primary responsibility, to prosecute people who 
have committed the most serious crimes under international law, 
falls on national judiciaries. That is very clear. So the ICC only 
becomes active when national judiciaries are not able or not willing 
to do their job. So a very important task of the ICC, and I think an 
important effect that the ICC has had, is that it makes national 
judiciaries look at their own responsibility in a very different way. I 
think that is a slow process, but I think we are seeing that. And I 
think that is a very important effect that the ICC is having and will 
certainly have over the long term.  
¶114 So we will discuss this aspect—there are complementarity 
situations that can be quite complex. I think Uganda is a very 
interesting complementarity situation, where you have on the one 
hand, of course, indictments against the senior leadership of the 
LRA. On the other hand, you have a willingness from the 
government of Uganda—that itself has referred its own situation to 
the ICC—has been willing to take on cases, probably cases only on 
lower levels than the most senior leadership itself.  
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¶115 And you have complementarity discussions outside the ICC. 
For example, in discussing the Goldstone report in the General 
Assembly, the General Assembly has called upon the parties of the 
conflict to conduct national investigations in order to bring people to 
justice that may have committed war crimes. So that is a 
complementarity discussion outside of the ICC, at least at this point, 
certainly. 
¶116 Now the second topic is cooperation; that I think everybody 
who works for the Court would agree is absolutely crucial for the 
effectiveness and for the future of this Court. I think States are really 
called on to fulfill their obligation in a manner that is different from 
the way that they have done it in the past. Sometimes the impression 
that I get is that states feel like, “We have established this Court, we 
have drafted the Rome Treaty, we have ratified it. Actually, we are 
paying for it. And that’s it. You know, we have done our part and 
the rest is done by the Court.”  
¶117 At the same time, we all know, as States, we all know that 
that is not true. This Court will never be effective and will never be 
operational unless it can rely on the cooperation from states. The 
most obvious example to illustrate this, of course, is the issue of 
arrest. This is not a Court that has a police force. This is not a Court 
that can execute its own arrests. That has to be done by States. And 
the record on arrests is not very good. We have had some arrests. 
We’ve had a number of surrenders. We have also had one person—
Katanga—[who] appeared voluntarily in The Hague. But actually 
the first arrest warrants ever issued by the ICC have not been 
executed and it has been, well, it has been more than five years. And 
that was in the case of Ntaganda. So that is the second issue that 
we’ll discuss. 
¶118 The third issue is the issue of victims. A really novel feature 
of the ICC is the role of victims, the participation of victims in the 
proceedings before the ICC, which has turned out actually to be a 
very big challenge. How, to what extent, to allow the participation 
of victims in the proceedings before the ICC is not a question that is 
finally resolved. But it is something that the Rome Statute provides 
for. It also provides for assistance to victims and restoration to 
victims. And that was actually one of the most interesting parts in a 
way of my trip to Uganda was to go to the north of the country, the 
area affected by the armed conflict, and to not only see projects 
funded by the Trust for victims, but also to interact directly with the 
victims in the affected communities. It is, I think, an extremely 
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interesting feature of this Court and I think it . . . raises a lot of 
questions that we have not really thought about in detail when we 
established this system. Because it means, de facto, that the Court is 
in a way an operational agency in the field, which is really not what 
a criminal court usually does, or is not the type of activity the court 
usually engages in. 
¶119 Finally, we will talk about peace and justice, which is of 
course a highly political topic. You have probably all had these 
thoughts yourself and you have certainly read about the discussions 
that are ongoing, either in connection with Darfur or anywhere else. 
How do you square the demands of peace with the demands of 
justice? Now we all like to say that peace and justice go hand in 
hand and that they are complementary, they are not mutually 
exclusive, and all these nice things. And I also like to think they are 
true.  
¶120 But the fact certainly is that in reality, that can be an 
extremely difficult challenge. And it can be very, very, very difficult 
to balance the demands of peace with the demands of justice. Now 
this is not something the ICC has invented as a problem. You know, 
this was a problem with the international tribunal, where you have a 
situation like Cambodia where it has long passed. But as Fatou has 
pointed out this morning, this is a Court that is active in situations 
that are still conflict situations. Or, you know, shortly after conflict, 
but certainly with a good chance of relapsing into conflict.  
¶121 So we will discuss this in Kampala, and not in a manner that 
is conclusive. We will not walk out of Kampala and say, “Here, 
these are the guidelines that every mediator in every conflict in the 
world now has to follow,” because that is impossible. But we will 
put it on the table, and we hope we will have a very good and very 
open discussion. And we will identify the challenges. And actually I 
think this is the beginning of a discussion, not the end of a 
discussion. It is a discussion that is very often avoided because it is a 
very, very difficult debate. So the Security Council has never had a 
very open debate on an Article 16 situation. They have never had an 
open meeting where they decide whether they should or should not 
defer an investigation against the President of Sudan. Or whether 
they should or should not do this in the case of Uganda. So this I 
think will really be a springboard for future discussions, but it is 
very important that we put this on the table. 
¶122 Now the overall goal [of the Review Conference] is that 
[the] states parties [must] agree that the Rome Statute is a good 
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treaty. We do not have a large number of amendments on the table. 
We had some proposals, especially on the jurisdictional parts. We 
had proposals to add the crime of terrorism, to add the crime of drug 
trafficking, to add nuclear weapons to the list of illegal weapons. 
Not easy proposals, as you can see. But everybody has agreed, and I 
think that’s important, and the states that put these proposals on the 
table, after we discussed these suggestions. We understand that this 
is not consensual. We understand that this is difficult. We 
understand that this is not in the best interest of the Court right now, 
so we are happy to talk about this at a later [time]. I think that is a 
very important indication that there is a strong consensus that this is 
a good treaty. 
¶123 Now not to say that there will not be changes in the future. I 
think there will be, but likely of a less spectacular nature than in the 
jurisdictional part of the Statute. I think people in general feel that 
the core crimes, and perhaps the crime of aggression, depending on 
where you stand, give the Court a very good body of law and there’s 
not really a need to add on additional crimes at this point. So that, I 
think, is a very important state.  
¶124 Second, I think the Kampala conference really gives us a 
unique opportunity to see where we stand seven years after, and to 
see—to discuss the question: what is the future of international 
criminal justice? I think the ICC is probably the biggest achievement 
that we have reached in the past fifteen or twenty years. And 
sometimes, we as states do not quite know what to do with it 
politically. I think we have not quite understood yet the effect that 
this Court has on the larger institutional landscape, so to speak. A lot 
of people like to treat it as sort of an isolated institution, that sits 
somewhere in The Hague and they do their thing and we get the 
press releases and we watch the webcasts on a good day. And maybe 
we don’t. And sometimes, they find out, “Oh, that actually affects 
what I do on a daily basis.” Unfortunately, that seems to be the case 
when something interferes or seems to interfere with whatever’s 
going on in the Security Council, but I think we really have to 
broaden our thinking. And you really have to consider how we 
integrate the international criminal justice agenda into the 
mainstream of what we do. How does it relate to our other 
activities? How does it relate to development? How does it relate to 
our political activities? That is the discussion we will need in the 
future, and I hope Kampala will be a very good point of departure 
for it. 
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¶125 Finally, I think it is very important and very welcome to me 
that this conference takes place in Africa and that it takes place in a 
situation country. It was not a very easy situation to reach. There 
was some unease among some states that said, “Well, you know, 
that could become very difficult.” But I really think it offers a 
unique opportunity to be in a place—I was in Uganda last week, and 
I was truly fascinated by the level of internal discussion that people 
have gone through in that country. I really don’t think that has 
happened anywhere else in the world. Maybe that has happened in 
the U.S., but for very different reasons, I am not sure. But in Uganda 
you have these people that have experienced this, have thought 
about this, and have talked about this in a manner that I really did 
not expect that was really very, very impressive to me. I think [that] 
is the best illustration of the effect that this Court has. This is not 
about just putting some militia leader on trial in The Hague, and 
then maybe he goes to jail for fifteen years, and maybe he is 
acquitted. This really has a strong impact on the ground, and I think 
that is really important.  
¶126 I hope that it . . . offers [an] opportunity to have a discussion 
in the region that is different at times than it has been in the past. 
But I have to say, I was also in Addis after my visit to Uganda and 
to the DRC. I also think the political discussion in Africa has really 
entered into a new phase. We had a very heated discussion, 
especially after last summer, after the indictment against the 
President of Sudan. Many of the things that people said would 
happen – that African states would leave the Court – they all have 
not happened. The President of Sudan has not traveled to any state 
that is a state party. And I think we are generally politically in a 
good place.  
¶127 For those of us who were in Rome—David [Scheffer] is one 
of them, I am one of them, there are others—I think we know that 
this Court would actually not exist without the African states. There 
was a very strong push from Africa at this time to say, “We want 
this Court. We need this Court.” And politically today, the African 
states are still the heart and soul of this Court because they’re the 
biggest constituency. They are the biggest constituency that we have 
among the state’s parties, and maybe I can finish with an anecdote 
from my visit last week. 
¶128 I was actually at the state house with President Museveni and 
we discussed the ICC, of course. That was the purpose of my visit. 
And one of his cabinet members said, “Yeah, but you know, it’s 
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really a problem that the ICC is targeting Africa.” And Museveni 
looked at him and said, “Well, but what do you want? We have all 
these problems here. And we cannot take the DRC and move it to 
Europe just to make it more balanced.” And for me, that was a 
surprising strong expression of support that he expressed and I think 
it was a very nice moment, the moment on which I want to finish my 
comments. Thank you very much. 
 
